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KSR V. TELEFLEX:  
PREDICTABLE REFORM OF PATENT SUBSTANCE 
AND PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIARY 
John F. Duffy* †
Introduction 
Though KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. is now widely acknowl-
edged in the bar and the academy to be the most significant patent case in at 
least a quarter century, that view dramatically underestimates the impor-
tance of the decision. The KSR decision has immense significance not 
merely because it rejected the standard of patentability that had been applied 
in the lower courts for decades, but also because it highlights many separate 
trends that are reshaping the patent system. 
This Commentary will touch upon four such trends that are clearly evi-
dent in KSR. First, the case was a predictable continuation of the Supreme 
Court’s reengagement in the field of patent law. Second, the decision repre-
sents a continued revision to the substantive standards applied in patent law. 
Third, and perhaps most overlooked, KSR heralds a significant procedural 
reform to patent litigation. Fourth, the decision presents a classic example of 
the judiciary revising judge-made doctrines in response to external criticism. 
This final point raises the interesting theoretical issue of whether the tradi-
tional common law process in the patent field has been fatally hobbled by 
the creation of a single intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over 
most patent cases. KSR holds out the hope that the judiciary is still capable 
of overseeing the field in the traditional manner, but developments in the 
Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) suggest that 
this tradition may be coming to an end. 
I. Predictable Reform 
It is exceedingly rare that a Supreme Court decision can be responsible 
for such a dramatic change in lower court law and yet have been so thor-
oughly predictable. I am confident in saying the decision was predictable 
because my 2003 Supreme Court Review article, The Festo Decision and the 
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, not only predicted a gen-
eral return of the Supreme Court to the patent field but also specifically 
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The KSR experience shows that attracting the Supreme Court’s attention 
to a patent law issue remains broadly similar, if not identical, to the process 
in other areas of federal statutory law. In deciding whether to grant certio-
rari, the Court looks for conflicting authorities. In patent law, conflicts 
between recent appellate decisions are nearly impossible due to the Federal 
Circuit’s almost exclusive jurisdiction over the area, and so the Supreme 
Court has learned to look elsewhere for signs of discord. In KSR, evidence 
of conflict came from a comparison of Federal Circuit decisions with earlier 
“pre-Federal Circuit” appellate decisions, from the opinions of scholars 
singled out the obviousness doctrine as an area that the Court would address 
“soon.” There is a story here, and it is worth telling because it shows how 
patent issues can continue to attract the Supreme Court’s attention despite 
the dominance of a single court of appeals over patent law. 
Long before KSR, a notorious divergence between the obviousness 
precedents of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit had been widely 
recognized by patent attorneys and scholars. The divergence was easy to 
see. While the regional circuits had cited the Supreme Court’s most recent 
decision on obviousness, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., about ten times per year 
prior to the centralization of patent appeals in 1982, the Federal Circuit cited 
Sakraida only four times in the twenty-four years between 1982 and the 
grant of certiorari in KSR. What’s more, in three of the four cases, the court 
had cited Sakraida only to disparage it. 
In 2002, three significant events occurred, essentially guaranteeing that 
the Supreme Court would soon review the Federal Circuit’s obviousness 
case law. First, the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged in Engineering 
Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc. that its obviousness precedents were signifi-
cantly different from regional circuit precedent applied prior to the creation 
of the Federal Circuit. That overt acknowledgment of a “circuit split” made 
it much easier for a party to petition successfully for certiorari. Second, in a 
case named In re Lee, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO’s refusal of a 
patent application and expressly indicated that the PTO should not rely on 
“common sense” in rejecting patent applications. That decision created a 
great deal of hostility at the PTO and also made the Federal Circuit doctrine 
seem unreasonable on its face. Third, the Federal Trade Commission held 
hearings that culminated in a report lucidly explaining the importance of the 
obviousness standard and documenting the PTO’s increasing hostility to 
Federal Circuit doctrine. 
At the Federal Trade Commission hearings, I realized that the Supreme 
Court would grant certiorari on the obviousness doctrine if only it were 
asked to do so. Indeed, it seemed incredible that the government had not 
sought certiorari after its then recent defeat in the Lee case. One PTO offi-
cial explained to me that seeking Supreme Court review was an onerous 
process inside the executive branch bureaucracy; I realized that private par-
ties would be far more effective than the government in bringing the issue to 
the Court. In subsequent speeches, I urged private attorneys to present the 
issue to the Supreme Court. As a result of those speeches, I had the good 
fortune to be asked to coauthor the successful certiorari petition. 
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(who had long noted the tension between Supreme Court precedent and 
Federal Circuit precedent), and from the government’s criticism of Federal 
Circuit doctrine in the Federal Trade Commission report. Yet even with this 
evidence, the Court was cautious; it asked the Solicitor General for his opin-
ion prior to the grant of certiorari—a technique that the Court has deployed 
frequently in the patent area. The resulting amicus brief from the Solicitor 
General confirmed the conflicting views and sealed the case for certiorari. 
II. Reform of Patent Substance
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has actively reviewed and 
changed the substantive standards of patent law developed by the Federal 
Circuit. KSR continued this trend, and, in fact, the most widely celebrated 
aspect of KSR is its substantive effect on the patentability standard. 
For almost all of its quarter century of existence, the Federal Circuit ar-
ticulated and applied a patentability standard under which subject matter 
claimed by a patent applicant would be considered nonobvious, and there-
fore patentable, unless it could be proven that a “teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation” previously existed to make the claimed subject matter. The test 
had become boilerplate in the Federal Circuit’s opinions and was applied by 
that court in KSR. In the very beginning of its legal analysis, the Supreme 
Court announced that it was “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of 
Appeals.” That simple, clear statement heralded a revolution in the field by 
disavowing years of lower court precedent. 
Yet for all its significance, the Supreme Court’s substantive holding was 
also precisely targeted and limited. True, the Supreme Court disavowed the 
rigid substantive standard that the Federal Circuit had applied for years, but 
the Court left open many possible ways in which the substantive standard 
could evolve. Though the Supreme Court has given the lower court a strong 
reminder that it should cite and follow all the higher Court’s precedents on 
the patentability standard, the Federal Circuit will still have substantial free-
dom, in the first instance, to choose which path the law should take in future 
cases. That is as it should be, for KSR was the first obviousness case adjudi-
cated by the Supreme Court in more than 30 years. But the limitations on 
the Court’s holding blunt the substantive effect of KSR somewhat; the deci-
sion offers the Federal Circuit a new starting point rather than a final 
destination.  
III. Reform of Patent Procedure
As important as KSR is substantively, the decision’s procedural signifi-
cance is even greater. Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit had held that its 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test presented an issue of fact for juries to 
determine. The teaching-suggestion-motivation test therefore had the practi-
cal effect of transforming the issue of patent validity—which the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held to be an issue of law—into an issue of fact. Con-
sequently, the basic validity of a patent, even one mistakenly issued without 
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KSR carries on that tradition of growth and correction, but it remains un-
clear whether the tradition will continue much longer. Congress has become 
increasingly willing to consider detailed patent legislation, which could dis-
place the traditional common law process through its sheer length, if 
perhaps not its clarity. Similarly, the PTO is becoming more aggressive in 
issuing guidelines and promulgating procedural rules as a means of control-
ling the development of the law. Such administrative actions could also 
displace judicially-developed common law. Furthermore, the primary pieces 
of patent reform legislation introduced this year in the House and the Senate 
consideration of the relevant prior art, could not be decided without a mul-
timillion dollar jury trial. 
In KSR, the Supreme Court restated once again that validity is an issue 
of law for judges to decide. The Court made this clear throughout the opin-
ion by detailing questions that “the court must ask” in deciding obviousness 
issues and by directing that “[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be 
made explicit.” Those directions clearly foreclose much jury involvement. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s disposition of KSR itself underscores that 
the issue of “obviousness is a legal determination,” as the Court held it “ap-
propriate” to invalidate the patent claim at issue on summary judgment. 
Thus, after KSR there will undoubtedly be a sea change in procedure, as 
deciding obviousness—and likely other validity issues—becomes the exclu-
sive province of the judge. 
Indeed, another Court decision just a few months before KSR greatly 
magnified the latter decision’s procedural implications. In January 2007, the 
Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. overturned the Fed-
eral Circuit’s restrictive case law on the availability of declaratory 
judgments in patent cases. In combination, KSR and MedImmune allow a 
party threatened with a potentially invalid patent to file a declaratory judg-
ment action as soon as the threat becomes known and to seek immediate 
summary judgment as to the patent’s validity. Such an action holds the 
promise of a relatively inexpensive and quick judicial decision on the basic 
validity of the patent. Defendants have long sought such an efficient method 
for challenging questionable patents; previously their best hope had been for 
new legislation that would create an administrative process for reconsidering 
the validity of issued patents. Now defendants may find their Holy Grail in 
the courts. 
IV. Judiciary Reform and the Coming Death of the
Common Law in the Patent System  
Although patent law is a creature of federal statute, it has long been 
dominated by judicially-created common law. As in antitrust (that “other” 
branch of federal monopoly law), the key statutory provisions fairly exude 
ambiguity. The hallmark of the common law process is the incremental de-
velopment of legal doctrine, as the courts themselves constantly experiment 
with changes and correct themselves when the changes go awry or go too 
far.  
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proposed delegating broad rule-making powers that would allow the PTO to 
supplant the courts as the primary organ for developing law and policy in 
the patent system. 
Thus, KSR may be one of the last great common law decisions on patent 
law. If that happens, the death of patent common law will be directly attrib-
utable to the creation of a single court of appeals in the field. Even with the 
Supreme Court’s increased oversight, the Federal Circuit is likely to remain 
the sole appellate court issuing binding precedents on many important issues 
in the field. Ironically, that concentration of judicial power on patent issues 
seems to be bringing about the demise of the traditional judicial power to 
shape patent common law. Supreme Court review—even for an issue suffi-
ciently important to prompt certiorari—may not be forthcoming for many 
years or even, as KSR shows, decades. The continual process of intercourt 
debate and incremental conflict so essential to the health of the common law 
has thereby been sacrificed on the altar of uniformity. In the absence of 
structural reform that would spread patent jurisdiction to a few additional 
circuits, as Craig A. Nard and I propose in our forthcoming Northwestern 
Law Review article, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, the cen-
turies-old arc of judicial development of patent law, of which KSR is merely 
the most recent part, may not survive long into this new century. 
